Abstract Assume that there are players and an eavesdropper Eve of unlimited computational power and that several pairs of players have shared secret keys beforehand. A key sharing graph is one in which each vertex corresponds to a player, and each edge corresponds to a secret key shared by the two players corresponding to the ends of the edge. Given a key sharing graph, a player wishes to send a message to another player so that the eavesdropper Eve and any other player can get no information on the message. In this paper, we give a necessary and sufficient condition on a key sharing graph for the existence of a protocol for such a purpose. We also give a sufficient condition for the existence of a protocol for the case where a player sends a message to a multiple number of designated players.
Introduction
Consider the following situation. There are n (≥ 2) players p 1 , p 2 , · · · , p n and an eavesdropper Eve of unlimited computational power, and several pairs of players have already shared secret keys. For simplicity, each secret key is assumed to be a one-bit number, although the result can be easily generalized to the case where a key can be an ℓ-bit number for any ℓ (≥ 1). Let G be a graph, called a key sharing graph [1, 4, 6, 7] , in which each vertex represents a player p i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and each edge p i p j joining vertices p i and p j represents a secret key k i j ∈ {0, 1} shared by players p i and p j , as illustrated in Fig. 1 . (Refer [2] for the graph-theoretic terminology.) A secret key k i j is known only to players p i and p j . All players and Eve know the shape of graph G. Every communication (conversation) between players is done through a public communication network and hence can be overheard by any player and Eve, although many conventional models of "secure message transmission" assume a private communication channel [3, 5, 9] . Since Eve has an unlimited computational power, one cannot use any cryptographic protocol based on the computational hardness assumption such as the RSA public key cryptosystem. All players can generate random numbers, and are "honest and faithful," that is, follow a specified protocol and don't "lie."
Under such a situation, if G is a connected graph, that is, G has a spanning tree as drawn by thick lines in Fig. 1 , then every player can send a one-bit message to all the other players so that the eavesdropper Eve can get no information on the message. Clearly, this can be done, within n − 1 communication rounds, by the "flooding protocol," which floods the message from p 1 to all players by using the secret keys on a spanning tree as "one-time pads." This can be done also with exactly one communication round [7] . In this paper we consider a protocol by which a player p 1 sends a message m ∈ {0, 1} only to a designated player, say p i , so that Eve and any player other than p 1 and p i cannot get any information on m. We prove that there is a protocol for such a purpose if and only if G has either an edge p 1 p i joining vertices p 1 and p i or a pair of paths between p 1 and p i having no common vertices except p 1 and p i . This result immediately implies that such a secure message transmission can be done between every pair of players if and only if G is a 2-connected graph. We also give a sufficient condition for a player p 1 to be able to send a message to a multiple number of designated players so that Eve and any other player get no information on the message.
Protocols and main result
In this section we first explain two protocols using one or two paths between p 1 and p i in a key sharing graph G, and then present our main result. 1 and p i cannot get any information on m, because they don't know the secret key k 1i , which is used only once as a "one-time pad" [8] . Every intermediate player on path P 1 gets m 1 but cannot get any information on m 2 , and hence cannot get any information on m. Similarly, every intermediate player on P 2 cannot get any information on m. Of course, Eve and every player, not on P 1 or P 2 , cannot get any information on m.
Thus we have proved the sufficiency in the following theorem.
Theorem 1.
A player p 1 can send a message to another player p i absolutely securely by some protocol if and only if a key sharing graph G has either an edge joining p 1 and p i or a pair of internally disjoint paths between p 1 and p i .
We prove the necessity in Theorem 1 in the succeeding section.
A graph G has a pair of internally disjoint paths between p 1 and p i if and only if a flow network constructed from G has a network flow of value 2 from p 1 to p i [10] . Therefore, one can examine in linear time whether G has a pair of internally disjoint paths between p 1 and p i .
A vertex v in a graph G is called a cut-vertex if the removal of v from G results in a disconnected graph. The vertex p 3 of the graph in Fig. 1 is a cut-vertex. A graph is defined to be 2-connected if there is no cut-vertex. The graph in Fig. 4 is 2-connected. A graph of three or more vertices is 2-connected if and only if there is a pair of internally disjoint paths between any two vertices [2] . Thus, Theorem 1 immediately implies the following corollary.
Corollary 1.
Every player can send a message to any other player absolutely securely if and only if a key sharing graph G is 2-connected.
Proof of necessity
Before proving the necessity in Theorem 1, we formally define a graph, key information, protocol, communication model, etc. [6] . We denote by G = (V, E) a graph with vertex set V and edge set E. There may exist multiple (parallel) edges in G, as illustrated in Fig. 4 . For each vertex p v ∈ V , we denote by E(p v ) the set of all edges incident to p v . We denote by E(p u , p v ) the set of all multiple edges joining vertices p u and p v , and hence
A vertex p v in a key sharing graph G = (V, E) represents a player p v , while an edge e j in G represents a secret key k j ∈ {0, 1} shared by the two players represented by the ends of e j . If |E(p u , p v )| = ℓ, then each of the ℓ multiple edges in E(p u , p v ) represents a 1-bit secret key and hence players p u and p v share a secret key of ℓ bits. All the keys are assumed to be uniformly distributed over {0, 1}. Therefore, there are 2 |E| possibilities. Each can be represented by a set of keys
Such a set K is called a key information of G. There are exactly 2 |E| key informations, and each of them occurs with probability 1/2 |E| .
For a set E ′ ⊆ E, let
For every player p v ∈ V , the set K(E(p v )) is called a partial key information of p v , and is simply denotes by
Let r v ∈ R v be a random number given for each player p v ∈ V , where R v is a nonempty finite set. The size of set R v depends on a protocol and a key sharing graph. For the protocol II in the preceding section, the sender p 1 needs a one-bit random number m 1 , and hence |R 1 | = 2. On the other hand, every other player p v needs no random number, and hence we set
In our protocol it is assumed that each player p v ∈ V is given a partial key information
The triplet (K, R, m) of a key information K, a random number set R and a message m is called a protocol point. Given a protocol and a key sharing graph G with designated sender p 1 and receiver p i , both the conversation σ and the value output by p i are uniquely decided only by a protocol point (K, R, m). Player p 1 must send a message to p i absolutely securely for any protocol point (K, R, m). Therefore, neither Eve nor any player other than p 1 and p i can get any information on a message m. Hence, for any probability distribution P(m) of message m ∈ {0, 1}, any conversation σ and any player p v other than p 1 and p i ,
and
where P(m|σ ) is the (conditional) probability of a message being m under the condition that a conversation is σ , and P(m|σ , K(p v ), r v ) is similarly defined. (Obviously, Eq. (2) implies Eq. (1) if there are three or more players.) We have thus formally defined a protocol, a communication model, etc, and are now ready to prove the necessity in Theorem 1.
Proof of the necessity in Theorem 1
Suppose for a contradiction that p 1 can send any message m to p i absolutely securely by some protocol although a key sharing graph G has neither edge p 1 p i nor a pair of internally disjoint paths between p 1 and p i . Then we can derive a contradiction, as follows. Let σ be the conversation for a protocol point (K, R, 1). We write Fig. 6 . Since m = 1, p i outputs 1.
There is a protocol point (K ′ , R ′ , 0) with the same conversation σ above. Otherwise, a message is always 1 under the condition that a conversation is σ , and hence,
contradicting to the assumption that Eq. (1) holds for any propability distribution P(m) of message m. We then consider a protocol point
and 
Then we now claim that
for every p v ∈ V −V i and p v , p c ) ). Therefore, by Eq. (3) we have 
and r ′′ v = r ′ v and both the conversation for (K, R, 1) and that for (K ′ , R ′ , 0) are σ .
However, p i would output the value 0 for
. This is a contradiction, because p i outputs 1 for (K ′′ , R ′′ , 1).
One-to-multiple transmission
Consider a case where a player p 1 wishes to send a message m to a multiple number of designated players, say p 2 , p 3 , · · · , p q+1 , where q (≥ 1). We say that this can be done absolutely securely if neither Eve nor any player other than p 1 , p 2 , · · · , p q+1 can get any information on m. In this section, we give a sufficient condition for the existence of such a protocol. Before presenting the condition, we define two graphs F and H, each of which contains vertices p 1 , p 2 , · · · , p q+1 and some others. We then define a graph H (see Fig. 10(a) ). Let (α j , β j ), 1 ≤ j ≤ q, be q pairs of integers α j and β j , 1 ≤ α j < β j ≤ q + 1, satisfying the following (a) and (b):
(a) For each j, 1 ≤ j ≤ q, one can choose either a path P α j β j consisting of a single edge joining vertices p α j and p β j or a pair of internally disjoint paths P 1
between p α j and p β j . Furthermore, all these chosen paths are edge-disjoint, that is, any two of them have no common edge; and (b) Let V T = {p 1 , p 2 , · · · , p q+1 }, and let E T = {e j |1 ≤ j ≤ q} where e j is an edge joining vertices p α j and p β j . Then T H = (V T , E T ) is a tree, as illustrated in Fig. 10(b) .
Let H be the union of all the paths chosen in (a) above, as illustrated in Fig. 10(a) . It should be noted that, for some j and ℓ with 1 ≤ j < ℓ ≤ q, path P 1 Proof. There are the following two cases.
Case 1: G contains F.
Player p 1 sends a random number m 1 ∈ {0, 1} to all players in tree T 1 by the flooding protocol or that in [7] using the secret keys in T 1 . Similarly, p 1 sends m 2 (= m ⊕ m 1 ) to all players in T 2 . Every player p j , 2 ≤ j ≤ q + 1, is contained in both T 1 and T 2 , and hence can get m = m 1 ⊕ m 2 . Every player p v other than p 1 , p 2 , · · · , p q+1 is not contained in T 1 or T 2 , and hence cannot get any information on m. This protocol needs a 1-bit random number only for p 1 .
Case 2: G contains H.
Player p 1 can send a message to p 2 , p 3 , · · · , p q+1 by flooding the message encrypted by the secret keys in H along the edges of tree T H ; use either the protocol I with path P α j β j = p α j p β j or the protocol II with a pair of paths P 1 , where m ′ 1 is a random number generate by p α ℓ or p β ℓ . Since all the paths in H are edge-disjoint, every secret key in H is used only once as a "one-time pad." Therefore, Eve cannot get any information on m [8] . Thus, p 1 can send m to p 2 , p 3 , · · · , p q+1 absolutely securely.
Conclusions
We showed that a player p 1 can send a message to another player p i absolutely securely if and only if a key sharing graph G has either an edge p 1 p i or a pair of internally disjoint paths between p 1 and p i . This immediately implies that every player can send a message to any other player absolutely securely if and only if G is 2-connected. Furthermore, we give a sufficient condition for a player p 1 to be able to send a message to a multiple number of designated players absolutely securely. For simplicity, we assumed that a message and all secret keys are 1-bit numbers. However, one can easily extend the results to the case where a message and all secret keys are ℓ-bit numbers for any ℓ(≥ 1). In this case, ⊕ must be a bit-wise exclusive OR.
It is desirable to find a necessary and sufficient condition for the case where p 1 sends a message to a multiple number of designated players.
